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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology; Am. J. Th.* = *The American Journal of Theology ; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie ; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie ; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology ; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics ; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie ; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review ; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique ; Rev. Néo.-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique ; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini ; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie ; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik ; Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane.* —Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Kant und die naturwissenschaftliche Erkenntniskritik der Gegenwart. (Mach, Hertz, Stallo, Clifford.) H. KLEINPETER. Kantstudien, VIII, 2–3, pp. 258–320.

The author proposes to give a general interpretation of Kant's epistemology, a criticism of this from the standpoint of modern scientific theory, a statement of such of Kant's principles as have positive value, and an account of recent progress in epistemology. To Kant the mathematics and mathematical physics of his day were the ideal of science. Since then a new conception of the essence of science has arisen. Mathematics led the way, and the revision of its fundamental principles still proceeds. The epistemology of physics has changed even more radically ; not one of Kant's *a priori* principles of natural science is now unquestioned, not even the persistence of matter. The traditional logic is now seen to be wholly inadequate. Thus Kant's presuppositions have fallen away. Kant is a dualist : the existence of things-in-themselves, in the sense of naïve realism, he accepts uncritically ; hence arises for him the problem of knowledge. His answer is three-fold : That things-in-themselves are as such unknowable ; that we can know phenomena, and in part *a priori ;* that we can also rightly infer the truth of certain metaphysical ideas, though we cannot know them as we know phenomena. We can know the phenomenal world, because we have a part in its origin ; and this fact is logically necessary, because without it nothing like experience could come to pass. Kant's thing-in-itself is a mere hypothesis ; all that is given us is the psychological elements or rather complexes of these. The transcendental nature of space is a mere unsupported assertion. There is no ready-made space-perception ; it perfects itself only with time. Haptical, optical, and geometrical space are diverse. Space is a concept, a product of abstraction. The possibility of geometry rests simply on the power to construct spatial images and investigate their properties. How far these images correspond to reality is for experience to decide. In the Analytic, Kant assumes an ideal logic, as formerly an ideal mathematics. The table of the categories omits the most important concept-forming functions. Kant rightly shows that the activity of understanding is necessary to the conception of an object, and hence that the conception of an object must be unchangeable on its formal side; but he wrongly concludes that experience is possible only under certain *a priori* determinations. The conception of an object is not essential to experience. The given is not the object but the sensation complex; the rest is hypothesis. The Analytic of Judgments adds nothing to the argument. Particularly in the account of causality there is retrogression from Hume. Kant gives no criterion between the causal judgments of science and those of superstition. The Dialectic is of no present significance, because we now dispense with the notion of an undetermined. Besides, Kant assumes an infallible reason shared in by all men, an assumption that we do not make. Kant has had great influence on the development of the epistemology of natural science, as represented by Mach, Pearson, Stallo, Hertz, Cornelius, and Clifford. These men follow him in his criticism of the older ontology, while rejecting his own unjustifiable metaphysics. In affirming the ideality of the phenomenal world, they even go beyond Kant to Berkeley. They recognize the self-activity and freedom of thought. While rejecting the categories as such, they hold that our concepts are creatures of our minds, subject to mental laws. They go beyond Kant in affirming that the causal connection may be variously established by the mind. They accept an *a priori* (as in the most general principles of physics), but not in Kant's sense as before all experience and independent of it. These principles are in part axiomatic because mere definitions. The fundamental ground of difference with Kant is the rejection of the Platonic ideal of science as confined to universal and necessary truth. Science is a human product; it has, therefore, its end, namely, to spare us direct experience. The certainty of direct experience is confined to the moment and the individual. Science makes available the experience of others and our own former experience. The conclusions of science are universal and necessary for all who accept its presuppositions; but to this no one is forced. Of two rival theories (both being logically correct), that one has higher worth which mediates in the simpler way the knowledge of the facts. The certitude of science is, of course, never equal to that of direct experience. Mediate knowledge rests on the acceptance of certain fundamental propositions. The direct experience can only show their incorrectness, not their correctness; they are, therefore, within limits, arbitrary.

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

The Refutation of Idealism. G. E. MOORE. Mind, 48, pp. 433–453.

It is intended to show that the proposition *esse est percipi* is false in all the senses ever given to it, especially the idealistic. If *esse* is *percipi*, whatever is, is indeed something mental; but not in the sense in which reality is mental for the idealist. That sense is, that *esse* is *percipere;* this, however, has always been proved by using the premise that *esse est percipi.* This proposition contains three very ambiguous terms. *Percipi* originally meant sensation only, perhaps; for modern idealism, it includes thought, and it may be here conveniently understood as referring to what is common to sensation and thought. As for the copula *est*, it may have three meanings: (1) That *esse* and *percipi* are precise synonyms; this does not need refutation; (2) that what is meant by *esse*, though not absolutely identical with what is meant by *percipi*, yet *includes* the latter as a *part* of its meaning. On this statement, the reality of anything would consist in its being experienced and something more besides. This meaning is important only if the third possible meaning is valid, viz.: (3) That wherever the other properties of reality are present, *percipi* is also present, and may be inferred from them. *Esse est percipi* would thus be a necessary synthetic proposition. Understood as such, it is not refutable. But what the idealists maintain is, not that it is such, but the proposition that whatever is experienced is necessarily so; the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject. And it is probable, in spite of their disclaimers, that they hold this principle because they believe it to be proved by the law of contradiction alone. They fail to see that subject and object are distinct at all. Many would object to this, and say that they held only that, while distinct, they form an inseparable unity, and that to consider either by itself would be to make an illegitimate abstraction. But abstractions are illegitimate only when that is asserted of a part which is true only of the whole; Hegelians and others, however, use this principle to show that, when we try to assert anything whatever of part of an organic whole, what we assert can only be true of the whole. This is necessarily false. Leaving the question: 'Is *esse percipi?*' let us ask: 'What is a sensation or idea?' Let us call the common element in sensations 'consciousness,' and that in which they differ the 'object' of sensation, without for the present attempting to define the meaning of either term. The question then arises whether, when, *e. g.*, the sensation of blue exists, it is the consciousness which exists, or the blue which exists, or both. These three alternatives are all different, so that to hold that to say 'blue exists,' is the *same* thing as to say 'both blue and consciousness exist,' is self-contradictory. But the consciousness must exist in every sensation as a mental fact, so that either both exist or the consciousness exists alone. Hitherto the universal answer to this alternative has been that both exist. The 'object' has been regarded as the 'content' of a sensation or idea, one 'inseparable aspect,' the other being 'existence.' What does this mean? Blue, for example, is part of the content of a blue flower. If it is part of the content of the sensation of blue, it must have to 'consciousness,' the other element the sensation contains, the same relation it has to the other parts of the blue flower. It is then here, as in a flower, the quality of a thing, in this case of a mental image. But this traditional analysis does not correspond to the fact. The common element in ideas is just what we have called it, consciousness or awareness, and to be aware of blue is not to have an image in the mind of which blue is the content. The awareness has a unique relation to blue, and this, the very same unique fact which constitutes every kind of knowledge, has been neglected in the prevailing content theory, because philosophers have had no clear conception of what consciousness is, it being much more elusive for inspection than the 'objective' element in sensations. In knowledge we transcend the circle of our mere experience; we know objects, not mere contents. Nothing we experience is an inseparable aspect of our experience, and the assumption that *esse est percipi* is utterly unfounded. If 'objects' were merely inseparable contents, solipsism could never be disproved. If, on the other hand, we clearly recognize the nature of that peculiar relation called 'awareness of anything,' the question for us is not: 'Why external real things?' but rather: 'Why not external reals, since there is the same evidence, awareness, for their existence as for that of our sensations?' The only reasonable alternative to such a dualism of matter and spirit is absolute scepticism.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

La logique et l'expérience. F. LE DANTEC. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 1, pp. 46-69.

The notion that mind or intellect is an implement of a superior kind, and that the perfection of its functioning is an *a priori* truth, is inadmissible from the biological point of view. The biologist regards mind as a result of evolution, and, therefore, as possessing no absolute value. Logic is simply the *résumé* of ancestral experience, the outcome of centuries of contact between our ancestors and the external world. This admirable mechanism is not a divine gift, but has become what it is through the accumulation and transmission of acquired characteristics. It is on a denial of this biological view of intellect that M. Poincaré bases his *La science et l'hypothèse.* A corollary of the position that M. Poincaré opposes is that geometry is an experimental science, and yet is neither approximate nor provisional. This thesis M. le Dantec attempts to establish by a criticism of M. Poincaré, and by a study, from the biological point of view, of human experience, ancestral as well as personal. The assertion that geometrical conceptions must be *a priori* because these conceptions, *e. g.*, the straight line and perfect circle, are ideal and not met with in experience, can be made only when we overlook the fact that our knowledge is determined by our human needs and powers. I can conceive perfect lines and surfaces because I have seen them. And if the microscope reveals the imperfection of these lines and surfaces, the fact remains that they present themselves as perfect to our unassisted observation.

M. S. MACDONALD.

The Definition of Will. III. F. H. BRADLEY. Mind, 49, pp. 1-37.

Several difficulties regarding the author's definition of will are here discussed. The first objection, that various typical volitions are irreducible, is answered by showing that in each case the volition consists in the self-realization of an idea, and that the various types differ only in the content of the idea. (*a*) Thus in Imperative volition the idea includes both the production of an act by another, as end, and the manifestation of my will to him, as means to this end. (*b*) The alleged Hypothetical type of will as conditional volition is not admitted. The Disjunctive will, if it exists, is the self-realization of a disjunctive idea, but is not disjunctive in its volition. (*c*) In Negative volition the idea to be realized is that of destruction or removal, and hence is positive. The relation of desire and aversion is next discussed. Desire, while negative in the implication of change in existing conditions, is predominantly positive. In aversion, on the contrary, the negation of that which is, constitutes the main end. The mistaken coördination of desire and aversion has arisen partly from transferring to them the opposition of the coördinates, pain and pleasure. This is confusing, since in desire, although the idea is pleasant, the content of the end need not contain pleasure. In aversion, also, some pleasure must be felt in the idea of the change, although the object itself is qualified by pain. Hence a transformation of desire into aversion is possible, and *vice versa.* From this point of view, the possibility of willing that to which we feel aversion must be denied. For, so far as will exists, the positive idea has prevailed, and aversion has become subordinate. It is, of course, possible to will or desire that to which we are averse, for this implies an actual aversion no more than a permanent will or disposition to act involves an actual volition. Against the argument that all desire contains conation, it is answered that conation is not proved to be essential to volition because the two are related in origin. Wish is a specialized form of desire whose object is imaginary, and hence can be regarded as attained. The means by which the idea in volition realizes itself is next discussed. To deny that the will is a causal factor in the production of the action is to reduce will to mere illusion. Desire and conation, since not found in all volition, cannot explain the result. Nor can pleasure and pain produce volition, for (*a*) they are not always present; (*b*) they are not identical with desire and aversion; nor (*c*) can they explain the detail of will. The actual machinery by which the idea is realized is found in the redintegration of a psychical disposition. Through experience of an originally physical disposition, the result of the process becomes qualified by feelings connected with its beginning, and hence the suggestion of these feelings tends to initiate the realization of the idea. The objection, that this account implies the sequence of a physical effect from a psychical cause, denies the real existence of volition, and is based merely on prejudice. A further objection, that it is not evident from this explanation why any idea should not realize itself, may be answered by referring to the fact of general inertia, the need of support in existing conditions, and the possibility that the idea of change may itself be so qualified as to preclude immediate realization. In the origin and growth of dispositions and habits, pleasure and pain are important factors, although they do not enter the essence of volition. It may be objected that will cannot be based upon dispositions, since dispositions really rest upon will. But the attempt to trace dispositions to an origin in volition cannot succeed, for dispositions seem to be physical in origin, and hence not subject to psychological investigation. Finally, if it were possible to trace the origin of dispositions in the individual to pleasure and pain, it could not be concluded that pleasure and pain were essential to the definition of will.

GRACE MEAD ANDRUS.

La raison et les antinomies. III. F. EVELLIN. Rev. de Mét., XII, 2, pp. 241–258.

The author, continuing the treatment begun in previous articles on the Kantian antinomies, asks whether the idea of spontaneity can be reconciled with the demand of science for invariable law. Strict necessity and bare contingency are both abstractions. In the homogeneity of the primitive stages in reality, spontaneity appears as simple undifferentiated movement, uniform and therefore apparently necessary. This stage of expansion yields to one of concentration and individualization, ending in the first dim appearance of *liberty* in man. All through nature we find the expression in every being of two wills, the generic will to continue the form of the species, the individual will to continue this form according to its own conditions and desires. The generic will apart from the individual is a mere formula; the individual apart from the generic is mere caprice. Both are elements in all sponaneity, law being founded on the first, and the variation which science must recognize as real having its cause in the second. Abstract order is a geometer's dream; real order is composed of variety and harmony. Law is based on the fixed will of the species, the difference between the law and the facts finds its cause in the will, always ultimately free, of the individual.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

Auf wem ruht Kants Geist? ERICH ADICKES. Ar. f. sys. Ph., X, 1, pp. 1–19.

Such a philosophy as that of Kant can never be appropriated as a whole by any other independent mind. Both the intellectual environment in which he lived and his own personal character contained many conflicting elements such as could never be identically reproduced. The rationalism of the Enlightenment was dominant in his thought as a whole, but occasionally yielded to opposed tendencies. This rationalism shows itself especially in the demand for universal validity which deprived his religion of individual adaptiveness, made an ideal of mathematical form and method, and prevented the acceptance of Hume's causal theory. Kant was forever compromising between his theoretical conclusions and the needs of his feeling and willing nature. It is in his inconsistencies as a thinker that his human character is revealed. No other thinker could support just such inconsistencies as Kant's. Nor, after giving up the system as a whole, can one fairly claim to be thinking and teaching as Kant would do under the altered conditions of to-day; for of what character his life-work would be to-day no man knows. To be a Kantian in the wider sense of the term, — to carry on this or that tendency of his and transform it in accordance with present needs, — is scarcely more or less than to be a philosopher at all.

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

Helmholtz in seinem Verhältnis zu Kant. A. RIEHL. Kant Studien, IX, 1 u. 2, pp. 261–285.

Helmholtz was the first to revive interest in Kant by calling attention to the agreement between the results of the Transcendental Æsthetic and those of the modern physiologico-psychological theory of sensuous perception. But it is not in the physiological interpretation of Kant, now recognized as inadequate, that the significance of Helmholtz for philosophy is to be sought, but rather in his reassertion of the close relationship between philosophy and science, which had been broken by the speculative systems of Schelling and Hegel, by recognizing the peculiar domain of a discipline which had been placed under suspicion by the exaggerated claims of the Identity Philosophy. Philosophy with Helmholtz was identical with epistemology, and its rights in that domain he asserted again and again. He emphasized, in the spirit of Kant, the distinction between metaphysics and philosophy; for by metaphysics he understood "that so-called science whose purpose it is to discover, by pure thought, the final principles which are to explain the world." There is also a metaphysics in science, but Helmholtz is no materialist, and he censures the "tirades of Vogt and Moleschott," and those naturalists who have taken the traditional scientific conceptions of matter, energy, and atoms, and have made them mere metaphysical catchwords. Helmholtz approaches the Kantian doctrine most nearly in an early sketch which contains the first outlines of his philosophy. A twofold task of science is distinguished: (1) The ordered review of the empirical, and (2) the formulation of concepts from which the particular perceptions may be deduced, concepts which are declared to be universal and necessary forms of all perception of nature. Practically the same views are expressed in the treatise on the conservation of energy, published a little later, at the age of twenty-six, but Helmholtz refers to them in later life as having been influenced too strongly by the epistemological doctrine of Kant. While the differences between his early and his later views are not so great as he thought, it is true that his doctrine of causality approached more nearly to that of Hume and Mill than to that of Kant. The reasons for this change of attitude toward Kant are to be found in his physiological interpretation of the critical philosophy, in the comparison which he draws between the forms of perception and thought and Müller's theory of the specific energy of the senses. This way of regarding the *Critique* led to a misapprehension. All the emphasis was necessarily placed upon the subjective origin of knowledge *a priori*, while Kant's purpose was to prove the objective validity of this knowledge *although* it was *a priori*. Of the two objections Helmholtz brings against Kant's doctrine of space, the first, namely, that the axioms which determine the idea of space are not necessities of thought, is entirely in the sense of Kant, and the second, that the axioms of geometry cannot be admitted to be grounded in the given form of our faculty of perception, does not disprove but rather confirms his position. The argument of pseudospherical space has not been made out. Original endowments play less and less part in Helmholtz's theory of knowledge until impulse and reflex movements alone remain. Increased emphasis is placed on the concept of uniformity in order to explain the correspondence between thoughts and things, cause and energy. Helmholtz's later doctrine of connotations, his argument against the syllogism, and his 'permanent possibilities of sensation' show clearly the influence of Mill.

EMIL C. WILM.

PSYCHOLOGY.

On the Definition of Psychology. JAMES WARD. Br. J. Ps., I, 1, pp. 3–25.

Though the question is of prime importance to all students of philosophy, a precise definition of psychology has never been formulated. The history of psychology shows three attitudes toward mental phenomena: (1) The unduly objective attitude by which mind is identified with life; (2) the unduly subjective, by which mind and body are completely separated; (3) the more mature balance of the two former in the concept of concrete experience. Aristotle is the chief representative of the first attitude. The soul is, for him, the form of the body. His conception corresponds closely to the modern biological notion of function. Even the passive intellect he regards as in close relation to the organism, though he holds that there exists also an active intellect by which man participates in the divine. Descartes is the representative of the subjective psychology. He began by regarding mind and matter as two incompatible substances, and restricted psychology to the immediate facts of consciousness. His rationalism, however, led him into analytic distinctions and away from concrete facts. The complete dualism of his system left no way of explaining the actual connection of mind and body except by an appeal to the deity. Descartes failed to see that objectivity is a necessary condition of conscious experience, and that the separation of the two is an abstraction from concrete reality. We must, therefore, reject all definitions of psychology as the science of 'mind,' or the science of the 'internal sense.' Psychology deals with the subjective standpoint of individual existence, but this means the standpoint of the living subject in intercourse with its environment.

Physical science deals with the aspects of experience which are common to all individuals. From the standpoint of psychology, the life of the individual is seen to be mainly volitional and emotional, a fact which was overlooked by the prevailing intellectualism of psychology before Kant. Cognition and perception are now seen to be instruments for the guidance of volition and action. For the definition of psychology the term 'experience' is preferable to the more common term 'consciousness,' because the latter does not sufficiently recognize the duality of subjective and objective, and consequently leads to ambiguity. Since we know no experience except our own, analytic psychology must precede genetic.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

An Inquiry into the Nature of Hallucinations. BORIS SIDIS. Psych. Rev. XI, 1, pp. 15–29; 2, pp. 104–137.

Every normal percept is composed of a sensory nucleus and a mass of secondary elements which are organically related to it. The nucleus is the prominent and vivid portion of the percept, the portion corresponding to direct peripheral stimulation; the other elements, though indispensable, may vary considerably without vitally affecting the quality of the percept. These secondary elements are not representative memory images, because they fuse with the nucleus and are sensory in character. Thus, we visually perceive hardness and smoothness. Yet they are not really sensations, for there is no external stimulus to correspond to them. They must be described, therefore, as secondarily sensory, and as forming an intermediate stage between real sensations and representative ideas. Physiologically, it may be assumed that these perceptual complexes correspond to the functioning of organic complexes of psycho-physical elements associated with a central nucleus. Hallucinatory perception arises from the dissociation of these secondary sensations from the nucleus of the percept. In pathological cases the directly stimulated portions of the percept frequently disappear entirely from consciousness, and the secondary sensations, together with other associated material, appear as the hallucinatory perception. These facts are opposed to the view that hallucinations are ever of purely central origin. They point to the belief that hallucinations are always of peripheral origin, and are to be regarded as complex cases of secondary sensations from which the primary sensation is dissociated and put into the background of consciousness. The dissociation and subexcitation of the secondary elements are the central conditions of hallucination; peripheral stimulation supplies the nucleus around which the secondary elements crystallize. The dream consciousness is an example of hallucinatory perception. Here a direct sensation (usually coenæsthetic) associates with it systems of secondary sensations almost at haphazard, though the associated system must have some slight degree of congruence with the primary sensation. The dream consciousness shows many of the characteristics of the mental dissociation found in serious mental disorders; insane hallucinations are in many respects waking dreams. The intense reality which attaches to hallucinations arises from the sensory character of their contents, for, under ordinary circumstances, the senses are, so to speak, our points of contact with reality. Any state of mental dissociation, like light sleep, favors the formation of hallucinations. The theory of the central arousal of hallucinations rests on the fallacy that an ideational element, by increase of intensity, may become sensory, a view which is untenable on both psychological and physiological grounds. The theory of dissociation explains also the phenomena of double thinking, in which the patient hears his thoughts uttered aloud by an external voice. This is due to subconscious whispering of the thoughts and to the consequent stimulation of the auditory centers. The merely central and the merely peripheral explanation of these cases are alike inadequate.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

Verstehen und Begreifen: Eine psychologische Untersuchung. II. HERMANN SWOBODA. V. f. w. Ph., XXVII, 3, pp. 241–295.

Expression, which, as has been pointed out, has primarily a subjective significance and is only secondarily a means of communication, may be described generally as a secondary excitation in the motor centers or in any other part of the nervous system. In many cases the kind of excitations and the excited field are not dissimilar in different persons, *i. e.*, the movements have become conventional as gestures. The primary excitations and the objects of expression are feelings. How feelings are transferred may be illustrated by the art of music. It is often denied that music has content; its whole content is said to consist in its form. Opposed to this claim of the theorists is the testimony of artists themselves, on the one hand, and of hearers, on the other, to whom music is a revelation such as no language has power to impart. But it is easy to attach too much importance to the feeling of the artist or the hearer. For the artist probably undervalues the intimate relation of his work to his whole personality, and ascribes the service it renders him to its objective quality; the dilettante is often perplexed because a song into which he has 'thrown his whole soul' is utterly without effect on others. And, in the case of the hearer, the effect that a piece of music produces on him depends upon a whole series of circumstances with the production of which the music has nothing whatever to do; this is sufficiently apparent when we consider that the effect is often very different. Music is, of course, a means of expression, because it is often influenced by feeling; but this is represented in its form. The characteristic form elements of a feeling are transferred to a definite presentation field. To illustrate: The complex 'love-longing,' which is to form the content of a composer's piece, and which may be represented by a curve showing the rise and fall of feeling, has characteristic form elements which are taken up by the form elements produced by the various devices known to the musical artist. Expression may be defined physiologically as the uniforming influence upon the more sensitive of two nervous fields simultaneously excited by virtue of the intimate connection of the whole nervous system and its economical nature. The stronger and more persistent the excitation, the more uniforming the influence; hence the testimony of great composers that, if they only hold before them clearly and definitely a given feeling, the musical elements of a composition take form quite spontaneously. For power of expression, as distinguished from designation or description, spoken language has a great advantage over the written symbol by reason, again, of the greater mobility of its form. The symbol, or in spoken language the mere articulation, communicates the thought (designation) ; the modulation of the voice expresses the feeling which the thought produces ; it is the commentary of the emotions upon the propositions of the intellect. The power of expression is far less in language than the power of impression ; for while it serves the subjective needs of the speaker or writer only indifferently, it is able by virtue of its power of designation to produce the conditions of feeling, the psychical situation, from which the feelings will emerge of themselves. Understanding has heretofore been used synonymously with apperception ; but when we come to the understanding of predication, an important distinction must be made. The traditional treatment of apperception has not sufficiently distinguished between apperception of objects and that of predication. While an object is a thing apart, a predication is a part of a greater whole, and it has meaning only in its relation. If a predication is to be understood, it is not so important to establish a relation between it and the hearer, as to establish in him the same relation as exists between it and the person making it. Apperception means the reception and modification of a percept by my peculiar mental content, which, in the case of predication, can mean nothing else than to misunderstand it. To understand it means to construct from my own psychical material the mental content of the speaker. Apperception and understanding can be identical only if the mental contents of two individuals are the same. According to Avenarius's theory of the vital series, to understand a thing means to include it in the series; to misunderstand it means not to include it in the series ; and the whole meaning of a predication will depend upon the place in the series which it occupies. A sure criterion by which to determine with what section of a series we have to do is the feeling by which it is accompanied. The initial section (vital difference) is accompanied by feelings of pain ; the medial section, in which we are groping about for solutions, by feelings of uncertainty, unclearness ; while the conclusion of the series is accompanied by the pleasurable feeling of relief. A predication in the initial section, in order to be understood, needs only to contain a designation of the circumstances which brought about the vital difference. Understanding of the medial section demands the vital difference belonging to it, which is also the case in the final section of the series.

EMIL C. WILM.